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PERIODIC STRATEGIES IN OPTIMAL EXECUTION WITH MULTIPLICATIVE
PRICE IMPACT
DANIEL HERNA´NDEZ-HERNA´NDEZ∗, HAROLD A. MORENO-FRANCO‡, AND JOSE´-LUIS PE´REZ†
ABSTRACT. In this work we study the optimal execution problem with multiplicative price impact
in algorithm trading, when an agent holds an initial position of shares of a financial asset. The
inter-selling-decision times are modelled by the arrival times of a Poisson process. The criterion to
be optimised consists in maximising the expected net present value of gains of the agent, and it is
proved that an optimal strategy has a barrier form, depending only on the number of shares left and
the level of asset price.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this work we are interested in the problem of finding optimal execution strategies for a fi-
nancial market impact model where transactions can have a permanent effect. The analysis of
this problem has practical and mathematical motivations, and has been studied from different per-
spectives. Nowadays the use of algorithmic trading to execute large book orders has given rise to
important questions on the best way to execute the position, in order to decrease the negative effect
on the shift of asset price, and also obtain the better performance of the criteria to be optimised. In
general, existence of optimal strategies can not be guaranteed, and clearly depend on the structure
of the market model as well as on the parameters involved in its description.
In any market impact model, it is crucial to describe the way that order execution algorithms
will be generated. Despite the analytical tractability of the classical continuous time models, these
are unfortunately not implementable in practice. On the other hand, while the models with discrete
execution decision times are ideal, they lack analytical tractability, and numerical methods are
required to solve them. Recently, with the aim of developing a more realistic yet analytically
tractable model, random discrete execution times have been considered. Random observations are
suggested in various economic literatures. See, for example, the discussion in the introduction
of [27] motivated by rational inattention (see [29]) in macroeconomics literature. See also the
discussions given in [11, 21] for real option problems with random intervention times, and [13, 17]
for applications in optimal stopping problems and Bermudan look-back option pricing. On this
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regard, an important motivation for considering the Poissonian interarrival model is its potential
applications in approximating the constant interarrival time cases. It is known, in the mathematical
finance literature, that randomization techniques (see, e.g. [12]) are efficient in approximating
constant maturity problems with those with Erlang-distributed maturities. In particular, for short
maturity cases, it is known empirically that accurate approximations can be obtained by simply
replacing the constant with an exponential random variable [22].
In this note we propose a random clock, attached to the jumps of a Poisson process, for the times
when the execution decisions will take place. This is a new instrument that may represent advan-
tages from the implementation perspective, since the randomness provided by the random clock
included in the execution strategy introduce an additional unpredictable structure to the strategies.
The empirical justification of this model can be approached from the following perspective, related
to market micro-structural factors. It is well known that the dynamics and the volume of the trades
interact with the evolution of the market liquidity of an asset. The design of each portfolio is based
on the information arriving from the order flow of buys and sells decisions of other investors, but
not on who is behind each decision. This suggest that a strategic sequential trading to execute a
large book order is “event based”, represented by the new information inferred regarding the value
of the asset from the composition and existence of trades from the market participants. Thus, we
are proposing that the arrival process is linked with market parameters, like liquidity, volume, mar-
ket depth and order flows. Interestingly, this view point reflects the fact, well understood in high
frequency trading for instance, that time has a different meaning when we are operating an algo-
rithmic trading strategy using cycles depending on the amount of information received, instead of
the measurements based on chronological time.
The benchmark models assume that either trading can be done in continuous time or there are
constant intervals of time at which the portfolio is balanced. Neither of them has practical reasons
to be sustainable, besides their analytical tractability, since investors continuously gain information
about the trading environment. In the model proposed in this paper we are allowing a random clock
of time in which new information is processed, based on the evolution of the main factors of the
market. This is a good example of algorithmic trading which does not necessarily occur at a
high frequency rate, but leaving this possibility to execute the position with frequent sells when
the parameter of the Poisson process is manipulated to do so. Of course, it also helps to include
asynchronous transactions to hide as much as possible the strategy followed.
In this note we are assuming that the agent holds a large position and, as typically happen, we
expect that any selling strategy will lead to decrease of prices. When the agent is not active the
model adopted is a standard geometric Brownian motion with drift, following the work by Guo
and Zervos [18]. Another important element in the model is related with the manner to quantify
the revenues received by each selling strategy. On this regard, the criterion will be calculated as
the net present value of the difference between the gains of the selling strategy and the transaction
costs associated.
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In contrast with the multiplicative impact model presented here, in the seminal papers of Alm-
gren and Chriss [4], [5] and Almgren [3], the execution strategies are assumed to be absolutely
continuous functions of time, having a price impact acting in an additive way; Bertsimas and Lo
[11] also made fundamental contributions considering a discrete random walk model. In our case
the strategies are described as Lebegue-Stieltjes integrals with respect to the paths of the Pois-
son process, named periodic strategies, in analogy with the terminology used in insurance models
when dividend payment decisions are taken; see, for instance, [7, 8, 30, 31].
More recent contributions to the theory of optimal execution found in the literature include
Huberman and Stanzl [20], He and Mamaysky [19], Gatheral, Schied, and Slynko [16], Obizhaeva
andWang [24], Almgren and Lorenz [6], Engle and Ferstenberg [14], Schied and Scho¨neborn [27],
Alfonsi, Fruth, and Schied [1] [2], Schied, Scho¨neborn, and Tehranchi [28], Predoiu, Shaikhet, and
Shreve [25], and Lokka [23].
In order to find an optimal strategy over the set of periodic strategies, we restrict our analy-
sis to the set of periodic barrier strategies. This class of barrier strategies are very easy to be
implemented, since selling decisions are taken observing if the price of the stock lies above a
certain fixed level F and the remaining number of shares. Then, the first step consists in finding
the optimal barrier strategy that maximises the performance criteria. This is done by solving the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation associated to this problem, which allows us to obtain
an explicit form of the value function for this restricted problem. Imposing a suitable smoothness
condition on the value function we obtain the explicit value of the barrier Fγ associated to the
optimal strategy. This strategy can be described as follows: If the stock price is below a critical
level Fγ at a selling time, then it is optimal not to sell any shares. However, if the stock price lies
above the level Fγ when the random clock rings, it is optimal either to sell all available shares or
liquidate a fraction of the position that will have as a consequence that the stock price decreases.
A Verification Lemma is used to proved that the original optimisation problem within the periodic
strategies can be solved implementing only barrier strategies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the underlying model for
the stock price with multiplicative price impact and provide the performance criterion, as well as
the formulation of the optimal execution problem with periodic strategies. In Section 3, we obtain
an explicit form for the solution of the HJB equation associated to the value function over the
set of periodic barrier strategies. A Verification Theorem is provided (Theorem 3.5), showing an
explicit form for the optimal (or ε-optimal) periodic strategy, under appropriate conditions on the
parameters of the model. Finally, we defer the proofs of some technical lemmas to the Appendix.
2. MARKET IMPACT MODEL
In this section we describe the optimal execution model, based on the paper by Guo and Zervos
[18]. Let us fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Ft,P) satisfying the usual conditions and carry-
ing a standard (Ft)-Brownian motionW and an independent Poisson process N
γ . We consider an
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agent holding an initial position of y shares of a financial asset, which has to be sold maximising
the expected gains. The information available to the agent is enclosed in the filtration Ft.
The trading strategies are denoted by the duple (ξst , ξ
b
t ), which represents the total number of
shares that the investor has sold and bought up to time t, respectively. Then, the total number of
shares held by the agent at time t are given by
(2.1) Yt:= y − ξ
s
t + ξ
b
t ≥ 0, for t ≥ 0,
where, ξs, ξb are (Ft)-adapted increasing ca`gla`d processes such that
(2.2) ξs0 = ξ
b
0 = 0, E
[
e4λξ
b
t+
]
<∞ and lim
t→∞
Yt = 0.
Although not reflected in (ξs, ξb), there is the restriction that the agent cannot sell and buy shares
at the same time. The set of admissible strategies satisfying the previous conditions is denoted by
Ξ(y).
The stock price observed by the agent, independently of the actions of other market participants,
is modelled by the geometric Brownian motionX0 with drift
(2.3) X0t = µX
0
t dt + σX
0
t dWt, X
0
0 = x > 0,
where σ ∈ R and µ > 0 are constants. Let us suppose that the agent is implementing a strategy
(ξs, ξb) ∈ Ξ(y). Hence, when the agent decides to sell or buy some number of shares of the asset at
time t, we assume that there is an impact in the price, described as a multiplicative factor, namely,
the resulting price Xt is assumed to have the form
(2.4) Xt = X
0
t exp{−λ(ξ
s
t − ξ
b
t )},
for some positive constant λ describing the permanent impact on the price, and X0t is the solution
to (2.3). More specifically, following [18], the controlled process dynamics can be described as
the solution of the following stochastic differential equation
dXt = µXtdt + σXtdWt − λ(Xt ◦s dξ
s
t −Xt ◦b dξ
b
t ),(2.5)
where
Xt ◦s dξ
s
t = Xtd(ξ
s)ct +
1
λ
Xt(1− e
−λ∆ξst ) = Xtd(ξ
s)ct +Xt
∫ ∆ξst
0
e−λu du,
Xt ◦b dξ
b
t = Xtd(ξ
b)ct +
1
λ
Xt(e
λ∆ξbt −1) = Xtd(ξ
b)ct +Xt
∫ ∆ξbt
0
eλu du,
(2.6)
and the processes (ξs)c and (ξb)c are the continuous part of ξs and ξb, respectively. The pair
(Xt, Yt) is referred as the state process associated to the strategy (ξ
s, ξb).
One of the main differences between the model introduced by Guo and Zervos [18] with the
approach presented in this paper consists in presenting a different framework to execute the initial
position y. While Guo and Zervos assume that at each time t ≥ 0 the agent should decide the
number of shares to sell or buy, in this paper we assume that selling or buying can only occur
at some (typically random) time points, modelled by the jump times of an independent Poisson
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process (Nγt : t ≥ 0), with rate γ > 0. More precisely, the selling and buying strategies are given
by
(2.7) ξst =
∫ t
0
νssdN
γ
s and ξ
b
t =
∫ t
0
νbs dN
γ
s ,
where νst , ν
b
t are Ft adapted processes, representing the number of shares sold and bought at time
t, respectively. Since the agent cannot sell and buy at the same time, the following condition holds

νst = 0, if ν
b
t > 0,
νbt = 0, if ν
s
t > 0,
νst = ν
b
t = 0, otherwise.
Within this context, selling-buying shares are necessarily done at discrete periods of time (there
cannot be continuous selling and buying) since selling-buying decisions can only occur when the
process Nγ has jumps. The set of selling-buying decision times is denoted as T = {T1, T2, . . . },
and the quantities Tk − Tk−1, k ≥ 0, are the inter-selling-buying-decision times, which are ex-
ponentially distributed with mean 1/γ. The number of shares sold and bought at each decision
time Tj are denoted by ν
s
Tj
and νbTj , respectively, with Θ
s,b = {(νsT1, ν
s
T2
, . . . ), (νbT1 , ν
b
T2
, . . . )} rep-
resenting a selling-buying strategy via (2.7); the subset of strategies (ξs, ξb) ∈ Ξ(y) which can
be represented as in (2.7) is denoted by A(y). For those strategies (ξs, ξb) ∈ A(y), the operator
defined in (2.6) can be written as
Xt ◦s dξ
s
t =
1
λ
Xt(1− e
−λνst )dNγt = Xt
(∫ νst
0
e−λu du
)
dNγt ,
Xt ◦b dξ
b
t =
1
λ
Xt(e
λνbt −1)dNγt = Xt
(∫ νbt
0
eλu du
)
dNγt .
(2.8)
Let Cs, Cb be positive constants representing the transaction cost associated with the sell and
buy of shares, respectively. Then, the gains associated with each strategy (ξs, ξb) ∈ A(y) is given
by ∫ ∞
0
(
Xt ◦s dξ
s
t −Xt ◦b dξ
b
t − Csdξ
s
t − Cbdξ
b
t
)
,
and the agent’s objective is to maximise the expected net present value of gains
(2.9) Jx,y(ξ
s, ξb):= Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
Xt ◦s dξ
s
t −Xt ◦b dξ
b
t − Csdξ
s
t − Cbdξ
b
t
) ]
,
over the set A(y). The parameter δ > 0 is the discount factor, and we assume that δ > µ in order
to avoid arbitrage opportunities, as described in [18, Proposition 3.4]. Given an initial condition
(x, y) ∈ R+ × R+, we say that (ξ
s∗, ξb∗) ∈ A(y) is an optimal strategy if and only if
Jx,y(ξ
s, ξb) ≤ Jx,y(ξ
s∗, ξb∗), for all (ξs, ξb) ∈ A(y).
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The value function of this stochastic control problem is defined as
(2.10) u0(x, y) = sup
(ξs,ξb)∈A(y)
Jx,y(ξ
s, ξb).
2.1. Regularity property of the model. A remarkable property of our model is the regularity
[15], which is understood as the requirement that, first, the optimisation problem (2.10) has an
optimal solution and, second, as the initial position y is positive, it should be expected that the
optimal execution strategy does not involve buying decisions along the time needed to liquidate
the initial position. In the rest of this section we elaborate along the second condition, while the
first one will be approached in the next section.
Consider strategies where the agent only sell shares, i.e., strategies of the form (ξs, ξb) ∈ A(y)
such that ξb ≡ 0. The subset of strategies (ξs, 0) ∈ A(y) is denoted by As(y), whose elements are
represented only by ξs, and the value function u(x, y) for this problem is given by
(2.11) u(x, y):= sup
(ξs,0)∈A(y)
Jx,y(ξ
s, 0) = sup
ξs∈As(y)
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−δt (Xt ◦s dξ
s − Csdξ
s
t )
]
.
It is clear that u(x, y) ≤ u0(x, y), since A
s(y) ⊂ A(y); the equality between these value func-
tions is established in the next result.
Proposition 2.1. Let u0 and u be the value functions given in (2.10) and (2.11), respectively. Then,
u = u0.
In order to prove this result we need to use a technical tool described in the next lemma, which
proof is presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 2.2. For each (ξs, ξb) ∈ A(y), there exists ξ¯s ∈ As(y) such that ξst − ξ
b
t ≤ ξ¯
s
t ≤ ξ
s
t for all
t ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Recall that we only need to show the inequality u0(x, y) ≤ u(x, y). Let
(ξs, ξb) be in A(y) and consider the strategy ξ¯s ∈ As(y) as in Lemma 2.2. Now, we consider
the processes Xt = X
0
t exp{−λ(ξ
s
t − ξ
b
t )} and X t = X
0
t exp{−λξ¯
s
t}, which satisfy the following
SDEs,
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt − λ(Xt ◦s dξ
s
t −Xt ◦b dξ
b
t ),
dX t = µXtdt+ σX tdWt − λX t ◦s dξ¯
s
t ,
(2.12)
PERIODIC STRATEGIES IN OPTIMAL EXECUTION WITH MULTIPLICATIVE PRICE IMPACT 7
respectively, where Xt ◦s dξ
s
t , Xt ◦b dξ
b
t and X t ◦s dξ¯
s
t are given as in (2.8). Applying integration
by parts in e−δ(t∧τ¯m)Xt∧τ¯m , where τ¯m:= inf{t > 0 : X
0
t > m}, and using (2.12), it follows∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δt
(
Xt ◦s dξ
s
t −Xt ◦b dξ
b
t − Csdξ
s
t − Cbdξ
b
t
)
(2.13)
=
1
λ
(
x− e−δ(t∧τ¯m)X0t∧τ¯m e
−λ(ξst∧τ¯m−ξ
b
t∧τ¯m
)
)
−
δ − µ
λ
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δsX0s e
−λ(ξss−ξ
b
s ) ds
−
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs(Csdξ
s
s + Cbdξ
b
s ) +
σ
λ
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δsX0s e
−λ(ξss−ξ
b
s ) dWs
≤
1
λ
(
x− e−δ(t∧τ¯m)X0t∧τ¯m e
−λξ¯st∧τ¯m
)
−
δ − µ
λ
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δsX0s e
−λξ¯ss ds
−
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs Csdξ¯
s
s +
σ
λ
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δsX0s e
−λ(ξss−ξ
b
s ) dWs
=
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs(Xs ◦s dξ¯
s
s − Csdξ¯
s
s) +
σ
λ
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δsX0s (e
−λ(ξss−ξ
b
s )− e−λξ¯
s
s)dWs,
Note that
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δsX0s (e
−λ(ξss−ξ
b
s )− e−λξ¯
s
s)dBs is a square-martingale, since by hypothesis
E[e4λξ
b
(t∧τ¯m)+ ] <∞, whose expected value is zero; see more in [18, p. 293]. Then, taking expected
value in (2.13), it yields
Ex
[ ∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δt
(
Xt ◦s dξ
s
t −Xt ◦b dξ
b
t − Csdξ
s
t − Cbdξ
b
t
) ]
≤ Ex
[ ∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs(Xs ◦s dξ¯
s
s − Csdξ¯
s
s)
]
.
Then, letting t,m→∞ and using the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we get
(2.14) Jx,y(ξ
s, ξb) ≤ Jx,y(ξ¯
s, 0) ≤ u(x, y).
Since the above inequality holds for each (ξs, ξb) ∈ A(y), we conclude that u0(x, y) ≤ u(x, y),
completing the proof of this result. 
3. HJB EQUATIONS AND OPTIMAL EXECUTION
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the presentation of an optimal solution to the execution
problem (2.11), paying particular attention to the structure of this strategy. Roughly, we look for
optimal selling strategies with a simple structure, facilitating its adaptability from the practical
view point. One of the main results of this work establishes the existence of an optimal strategy
ξˆs, which has a barrier form in the state space. A barrier strategy is described in terms of the
remaining number of shares to be sold and the level of the observed price at each period of time.
These are compared with a mark, which is decided from the beginning and depends on a non-
negative constant F , referred hereafter as a periodic barrier.
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More precisely, fixing a periodic barrier F > 0, the number of shares to be sold in the i-th arrival
time Ti of the Poisson process N
γ , is given by
(3.1) νF (Ti):= YTi ∧
1
λ
(lnXTi − lnF )
+,
where (XTi, YTi) is the position of the state process at the arrival time Ti and (lnXTi − lnF )
+:=
max{0, (lnXTi − lnF )}. This type of strategies is denoted by ξ
s,F , and the set of these strategies
is defined by Asb(y), which is clearly a subset of A
s(y). The corresponding value function for this
set of strategies is defined as
(3.2) ub(x, y) = sup
ξs,F∈Asb(y)
Jx,y(ξ
s,F , 0),
with Jx,y as in (2.9).
In order to relate the above value function ub with the original one u, defined in (2.11), it
is convenient to provide a brief description of the approach to be followed. As a first step, we
shall solve the problem (3.2) using dynamic programming techniques. Noting that the periodic
strategies are described by a single parameter, the crucial point consists in proving that there is
a parameter Fγ , defined below by (3.11), for which there exists a smooth solution v to the HJB
equation (3.4) associated with ub; see Proposition 3.2. As a second step, using the parameter Fγ
a periodic strategy ξs,Fγ can be built using the expression (3.1). Finally, using the HJB equation
associated with the original value function u described in (3.3), in the last step it is proved that v
solves that equation, and that ξs,Fγ is optimal for u within the set As(y), concluding that ub = u;
see the Verification Theorem 3.7.
Remark 3.1. By standard dynamic programming arguments, it is well known that the value func-
tions u and ub, are associated to HJB equations, which are given, respectively, by
(3.3)


Lw(x, y) + max
0≤l≤y
{γG(x, y, l;w)} = 0, for all x > 0 and y > 0,
w(x, y) = 0, for all x > 0 and y = 0,
(3.4)


Lv(x, y) + γG
(
x, y,
[
y ∧
1
λ
ln(x/Fγ)
+
]
; v
)
= 0, for all x > 0 and y > 0,
v(x, y) = 0, for all x > 0 and y = 0,
where Fγ is a positive constant which will be determined later on. Here, the operators L and G are
defined by
Lf(x, y):=
1
2
σ2x2fxx(x, y) + µxfx(x, y)− δf(x, y),(3.5)
G(x, y, l; f):= f(x e−λl, y − l)− f(x, y) +
1
λ
(1− e−λl)x− Csl.(3.6)
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3.1. Construction and regularisation of the solution v to the HJB equation (3.4). Observe that
we can simplify the HJB equation (3.4) according with the following three different scenarios:
(i) When x < Fγ , this restriction corresponds to the waiting regionW because the price is too
low for selling any shares to be optimal, and therefore (3.4) takes the form
(3.7) Lv(x, y) = 0.
(ii) When Fγ ≤ x < Fγ e
λy, the agent takes and intermediate position of selling Y(x): =
1
λ
ln(x/Fγ) assets. Now since e
−λY(x) =
Fγ
x
, (3.4) can be written as
Lγv(x, y) + γ
[
v (Fγ, y − Y(x)) +
x− Fγ
λ
− CsY(x)
]
= 0,(3.8)
where
Lγv(x, y):=
1
2
σ2x2vxx(x, y) + µxvx(x, y)− (δ + γ)v(x, y).
(iii) Finally, when x ≥ Fγ e
λy, we have that the asset price is sufficiently high and the cor-
responding decision is to execute the complete set of assets available, and then (3.4) is
reduced to
Lγv(x, y) + γ
[
1
λ
(1− e−λy)x− Csy
]
= 0.(3.9)
We obtain explicit solutions for each one of the three regions, which are described in (3.10). A
quite important issue in the form of the solutions proposed below is the smoothness at the boundary
of each region, which derives in obtaining an explicit form of the general solution. The proof of
the following result is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.2. The HJB equation (3.4) has a solution v, which belongs to C2,1(R+ × R+) and
is given by
(3.10)
v(x, y) =


0, if y = 0 and x > 0,
(Fγ − Cs)(1− e
−λny)xn
λnF nγ
, if y > 0 and x < Fγ ,
Aγ
(
x
Fγ
)mγ
−
(Fγ − Cs) e
−λny xn
λnF nγ
+
γx
λ(η + γ)
−
γCs ln x
λ(δ + γ)
+ Cγ, if y > 0 and Fγ ≤ x < Fγ e
λy,
Aγ(1− e
−λmγy)xmγ
F
mγ
γ
+
γx(1− e−λy)
λ(η + γ)
−
γCsy
δ + γ
, if y > 0 and x ≥ Fγ e
λy,
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where η:= δ − µ,
Fγ :=
Cs
δ + γ
(
δ −mγ
(
δ
n
+
γb
δ + γ
))
η
η + γ
−
mγ
δ + γ
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
) ,(3.11)
Aγ :=
Fγ
λ(δ + γ)
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
)
−
Cs
λ(δ + γ)
(
δ
n
+
γb
δ + γ
)
,(3.12)
Cγ:=
γ(Fγ − Cs)
λn(δ + γ)
+
γ
λ(δ + γ)
(
bCs
δ + γ
+ Cs lnFγ − Fγ
)
,(3.13)
and b:=
1
2
σ2 − µ. The constants n,mγ are the positive and negative solutions to
1
2
σ2l2 − bl − δ = 0,(3.14)
1
2
σ2l2 − bl − (δ + γ) = 0,(3.15)
respectively.
Remark 3.3. The fact that δ > µ implies that the solution n to (3.14) satisfies that n > 1, for all
σ ∈ R.
3.2. Equivalence between the HJB equations. The rest of this paper is dedicated to verify that
the strategy given in (3.1), with barrier Fγ , defined above in (3.11), is optimal within the set of
strategies As(y), and that the function v given in (3.10), satisfies the HJB equation (3.3). To this
end we need the following technical results, whose proof is given in the Appendix in order to
introduce in a succinct way their main consequences.
Lemma 3.4. Let aγ be defined by
(3.16) aγ :=
1
δ + γ
(
δ −mγ
(
δ
n
+
γb
δ + γ
))
η
η + γ
−
mγ
δ + γ
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
) ,
where γ > 0. Then, for each γ > 0, 1 < aγ <
n
n− 1
, and it satisfies the following asymptotic
limits 
aγ → 1, when γ → 0,aγ → n
n− 1
, when γ →∞.
Proposition 3.5. Let v be as in (3.10). Then, for each (x, y) ∈ R+ × R+ the following identity
holds
max
0≤l≤y
G(x, y, l; v) = G
(
x, y,
[
y ∧
1
λ
ln(x/Fγ)
+
]
; v
)
,(3.17)
with G defined as in (3.6).
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Remark 3.6. Note that putting together Propositions 3.2 and 3.5, it follows immediately that v is a
solution to the HJB equation (3.3).
Next result identifies the solution of the HJB equation (3.10) with the value function u, providing
also an optimal strategy within the set As(y).
Theorem 3.7 (Verification Theorem). Consider the periodic optimal execution problem formulated
in Section 2 and the function v defined by (3.10). Then, v agrees with the value function u of the
periodic stochastic control problem. In particular,
u(x, y) = sup
ξs∈As(y)
Jx,y(ξ
s, 0) = v(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ R+ × R+.
Furthermore, define the strategy ξs∗t =
∫ t
0
ν∗sdN
γ
s with
(3.18) ν∗Ti = Y
∗
Ti
∧
1
λ
(
lnX∗Ti − lnFγ
)+
,
where Fγ is as in (3.11), T = {Ti}
∞
i=1 is the set of arrival times of the Poisson process N
γ , and
(X∗, Y ∗) is the state process associated with the liquidation strategy ξs∗. Then, the following
statements hold
(i) If µ− 1
2
σ2 ≥ 0, then ξs∗ is an optimal periodic liquidation strategy.
(ii) If µ− 1
2
σ2 < 0, then ξs∗ is not an optimal periodic liquidation strategy. So if we define
(3.19) ξs∗jt = ξ
s∗
t 1{t≤j} + y1{j<t}, for t > 0 and j ≥ 1,
then {ξs∗j}∞j=1 is a sequence of ε-optimal periodic strategies.
Proof. Take (x, y) ∈ R∗+ × R+ an initial condition, ξ
s ∈ As(y), described by the following selling
strategy Θ = {νT1 , νT2 , . . . }, where T = {T1, T2, . . . } is the set of selling times, and (τm)m∈N the
sequence of stopping times defined by τm := inf{t > 0 : Xt > m}. Using Itoˆ-Tanaka-Meyer’s
formula and the left continuity of the processes X and Y , we can see
e−δ(t∧τm) v(Xt∧τm , Yt∧τm) = v(x, y) +
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δs Lv(Xs, Ys)ds +Mt∧τm
+
∑
0≤s≤t∧τm
e−δs[v(Xs+, Ys+)− v(Xs, Ys)],
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whereMt∧τm := σ
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δsXswx(Xs, Ys)dWs. On the other hand
∑
0≤s≤t∧τm
e−δs[v(Xs+, Ys+)− v(Xs, Ys)]
=
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δs
[
v(Xs− e
−λνs, Ys− − νs)− v(Xs−, Ys−)
]
dNγs
=
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δsG(Xs−, Ys−, νs; v)dN
γ
s −
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λνs)Xs− − Csνs
]
dNγs
= Ht∧τm +
∫ t∧τm
0
γ e−δsG(Xs−, Ys−, νs; v)ds−
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λνs)Xs− − Csνs
]
dNγs ,
with G as in (3.17), Ht∧τm :=
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δsG(Xs−, Ys−, νs; v)dN˜
γ
s and N˜ is the compensated Pois-
son process. Hence, putting these pieces together and observing that
Lv(Xs, Ys) + γG(Xs−, Ys−, νs; v) ≤ Lv(Xs, Ys) + max
0≤l≤y
{γG(Xs−, Ys−, l; v)} = 0,
we have
e−δ(t∧τm) v(Xt∧τm , Yt∧τm) = v(x, y) +Mt∧τm +Ht∧τm(3.20)
−
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λνs)Xs− − Csνs
]
dNγs
+
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δs[Lv(Xs, Ys) + γG(Xs−, Ys−, νs; v)]ds
≤ v(x, y) +Mt∧τm +Ht∧τm
−
∫ t∧τm
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λνs)Xs− − Csνs
]
dNγs .
From (3.10) it is not difficult to see that there exists a positive constantK such that,
(3.21) |v(x, y)| ≤ K(1 + x+ y), for all (x, y) ∈ R+ × R+,
hence it follows that the processes (Mt∧τm ; t ≥ 0) and (Ht∧τm ; t ≥ 0) are zero-mean P-martingales.
Then, taking expectations in (3.20) we obtain
v(x, y) ≥ Ex
[
e−δ(t∧τm) v(Xt∧τm , Yt∧τm)
]
(3.22)
+ Ex
[∫ t∧τm
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λνs)Xs− − Csνs
]
dNγs
]
.
Now, from the expression of the processXt in (2.4) and recalling that δ > µ, we have that
lim
t,m−→∞
Ex[e
−δ(t∧τm) v(Xt∧τm , Yt∧τm)] ≤ lim
t,m−→∞
Ex[e
−δ(t∧τm)K(1 +Xt∧τm + Yt∧τm)](3.23)
≤ lim
t,m−→∞
Ex[e
−δ(t∧τm)K(1 +Xt∧τm + y)] = 0.
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Using (2.1) we note the following
(3.24)
∫ ∞
0
νsdN
γ
s = lim
t→∞
ξst ≤ y.
Then, letting m, t → ∞ in (3.22), using (3.23), (3.24) and Monotone Convergence Theorem, we
obtain that
v(x, y) ≥ Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λνs)Xs− − Csνs
]
dNγs
]
= Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs [Xs ◦s dξ
s
s − Csdξ
s
s]
]
.
Taking the maximum over all ξs ∈ As(y) we conclude that u(x, y) ≤ v(x, y). Let (X∗, Y ∗) be the
state process associated with the liquidation strategy ξs∗, given by ξs∗t =
∫ t
0
ν∗sdN
γ
s , with ν
∗ as in
(3.18). Note that ξs is admissible as long as lim
t→∞
ξst = y. We can easily check using (2.4) that this
indeed the case if and only if µ− 1
2
σ2 ≥ 0 since lim sup
t→∞
X0t =∞. Proceeding in a similar way as
in (3.20), we get that
e−δ(t∧τ¯m) v(X∗t∧τ¯m , Y
∗
t∧τ¯m) = v(x, y) +M
∗
t∧τ¯m +H
∗
t∧τ¯m(3.25)
−
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λνs)X∗s− − Csνs
]
dNγs
+
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs[Lv(X∗s , Y
∗
s )ds+ γG(X
∗
s−, Y
∗
s−, ν
∗
s ; v)]ds,
where τ¯m := inf{t > 0 : X
∗
t > m}. Now, from the construction of v, we know that it is the
solution to (3.4). Therefore, we have that∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs[Lv(X∗s , Y
∗
s )ds+ γG(X
∗
s−, Y
∗
s−, ν
∗
s ; v)]ds = 0.
Hence, we obtain that
e−δ(t∧τ¯m) v(X∗t∧τ¯m , Y
∗
t∧τ¯m) = v(x, y) +M
∗
t∧τ¯m +H
∗
t∧τ¯m
−
∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λν
∗
s )X∗s− − Csν
∗
s
]
dNγs .
Then, taking expectations in the previous identity it follows that
v(x, y) = Ex
[
e−δ(t∧τ¯m) v(X∗t∧τm , Y
∗
t∧τ¯m)
]
+ Ex
[∫ t∧τ¯m
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λν
∗
s )X∗s− − Csν
∗
s
]
dNγs
]
.(3.26)
Now, letting m, t → ∞ in (3.26), using (3.23), (3.24) and Monotone Convergence Theorem, we
get
v(x, y) ≤ Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs
[
1
λ
(1− e−λνs∗)X∗s− − Csν
∗
s
]
dNγs
]
= Jx,y(ξ
s∗, 0) ≤ u(x, y),
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which implies the result. For the case when µ− 1
2
σ2 < 0, let us take (X
∗
, Y
∗
) as the state process
associated with the strategy ξs∗j given by (3.19). We can check that ξs∗j has payoff
Jx,y(ξ
s∗j, 0) = Ex
[∫ j
0
e−δt[X
∗
t ◦s dξ
s∗
t − Csdξ
s∗
t ]
]
+
1
λ
Ex
[
X
∗
τ˜j
[
1− e
−λ(y−Y
∗
τ˜j
)
]]
,(3.27)
where τ˜j = inf{Ti > 0 : Ti > j}. Also, we see that (3.26) is satisfied, if t = j, (X
∗, Y ∗) is
replaced by (X
∗
, Y
∗
), and τm with the stopping time τ¯m = inf{t > 0 : X
∗
t > m}. Then, letting
m→∞ in (3.26), it follows
Ex
[∫ j
0
e−δt[X
∗
t ◦s dξ
s∗
t − Csdξ
s∗
t ]
]
= v(x, y)− Ex
[
e−δj v(X
∗
j , Y
∗
j)
]
.(3.28)
Now, applying (3.28) in (3.27),
Jx,y(ξ
s∗j, 0) = v(x, y)− Ex
[
e−δj v(X
∗
j , Y
∗
j )
]
+
1
λ
Ex
[
X
∗
τ˜j
[
1− e
−λ(y−Y
∗
τ˜j
)
]]
.
Therefore noting that the right-hand side of this expression converges to v(x, y) as j → ∞ allow
us to establish that {ξs∗j}∞j=1 is a sequence of ε-optimal strategies. 
Remark 3.8. Notice that as a consequence of Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.4, we obtain that
lim
γ→∞
Fγ =
nCs
n− 1
:= F∞, lim
γ→∞
Aγ = 0, and lim
γ→∞
Cγ =
F∞
λn2
+
1
λ
(Cs lnF∞ − F∞) .
Recall that Fγ , Cγ, Aγ are given in (3.11)–(3.13), respectively. Hence, straightforward computa-
tions yield
lim
γ→∞
v(x, y) =


0, if y = 0 and x > 0,
(1− e−λny)xn
λn2F n−1∞
, if y > 0 and x < F∞,
F∞
λn2
(
1−
(
x e−λy
F∞
)n)
+
x− F∞
λ
−
Cs
λ
ln
x
F∞
, if y > 0 and F∞ ≤ x < F∞ e
λy,
x(1− e−λy)
λ
− Csy, if y > 0 and x ≥ F∞ e
λy .
These asymptotic limits allow us to recover the value function for the case of singular strategies
for the optimal execution problem obtained by Guo and Zervos in Proposition 5.1 of [15].
APPENDIX. PROOFS OF SOME TECHNICAL RESULTS
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Let us take (ξs, ξb) ∈ A(y) and Θs,b = {(νsT1 , ν
s
T2
, . . . ), (νbT1, ν
b
T2
, . . . )} the
selling-buying strategy associated with (ξs, ξb). Let T s ⊂ T the subset of decision times whose
elements κi are given in the following way
κ1:= inf{Tj ∈ T : ν
s
Tj
> 0},
κi:= inf{Tj ∈ T : Tj > κi−1 and ν
s
Tj
> 0}, for i ∈ {2, 3, . . . }.
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From here, we see 
ν
b
Tj
= 0 < νsTj , if Tj = κi,
νsTj = 0 ≤ ν
b
Tj
, if κi−1 < Tj < κi,
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}, with κ0 = 0. Let αi,j be defined as
αji :=
( j∑
ι=i
(
νsκι −
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{κι−1<Tk≤κι}
))+
, with i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . } and i ≤ j.
We construct ν¯s in the following way:
(i) If Tj /∈ T
s, then ν¯sTj = 0.
(ii) If Tj = κ1, then, ν¯
s
κ1
:= α1,1.
(iii) If Tj = κ2,
ν¯sκ2 :=

α
2
2, if ν¯
s
κ1
> 0,
α21, if ν¯
s
κ1
= 0.
(iv) If Tj = κ3,
ν¯sκ3 :=


α33, if ν¯
s
κ1
≥ 0 and ν¯sκ2 > 0,
α32, if ν¯
s
1 > 0 and ν¯
s
2 = 0,
α31, if ν¯
s
κρ
= 0, for ρ ∈ {1, 2}.
(v) Recursively, if Tj = κi, with i ∈ {3, 4, . . . },
ν¯sκi :=


αii, if ν¯
s
κi−1
> 0 and ν¯sκρ ≥ 0 for ρ ∈ {1, . . . , i− 2},
αii−1, if ν¯
s
κi−1
= 0, ν¯sκi−2 > 0 and ν¯
s
κρ
≥ 0 for ρ ∈ {1, . . . , i− 3},
...
αii−(p−2), if ν¯
s
κρ
= 0 for ρ ∈ {i− (p− 2), . . . , i− 1}, ν¯sκi−(p−1) > 0 and
ν¯sκρ ≥ 0 for ρ ∈ {1, . . . , i− p},
...
αi2, if ν¯
s
ρ = 0 for ρ ∈ {2, . . . , i− 1}, and ν¯
s
1 > 0,
αi1, if ν¯
s
κρ
= 0, with ρ ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}.
Now, we take the selling strategy ξ¯s as
(A.1) ξ¯st :=
∫ t
0
ν¯ssdN
γ
s =
∞∑
j=1
ν¯sTj1{Tj≤t}, for t ≥ 0,
and define Y t: = y − ξ¯
s
t for all t ≥ 0. Note that ξ¯
s
t = ξ
s
t = 0, when 0 ≤ t < κ1. Then,
Y t = y − ξ¯
s
t ≥ 0 and
ξst − ξ
b
t = −
∞∑
j=1
νbTj1{Tj≤t} ≤ 0 = ξ¯
s
t .
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Let us take t ∈ [κ1, κ2). If ν¯
s
κ1
> 0, it means that the agent sold ν¯sκ1 shares which are a fraction (or
the total) of his y initial shares. Otherwise, he only sold a fraction (or the total) of
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{0<Tk≤κ1}
and
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{0<Tk≤κ1} − ν
s
κ1
are accumulated for the next occasion when the agent decides to sell.
Then, Y t = y − ν¯
s
κ1
≥ 0. On the other hand,
ξst = ν
s
κ1
≥
(
νsκ1 −
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{0<Tk≤κ1}
)+
= ν¯sκ1 = ξ¯
s
t ,
ξst − ξ
b
t = ν
s
κ1
−
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{0<Tk≤κ1} −
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{κ1<Tk≤t} ≤ ν¯κ1 = ξ¯
s
t .
Let us take t ∈ [κ2, κ3). If ν¯
s
κ2
> 0, at the same way that the above case, we have that the
agent sold ν¯sκ2 shares which are a fraction (or the total) of y − ν¯
s
κ1
. Otherwise, he only sold
a fraction (or the total) of
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{κ1<Tk≤κ2}, or, a fraction of
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{0<Tk≤κ2} − ν
s
κ1
. Then,
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{κ1<Tk≤κ2}−ν
s
κ2
, or,
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{0<Tk≤κ2}−(ν
s
κ1
+νsκ2) are accumulated for the next occasion
when the agent decides to sell. Then, Y t = y − (ν¯
s
κ1
+ ν¯sκ2) ≥ 0. On the other hand,
ξst = ν
s
κ1
+ νsκ2 ≥ ν¯
s
κ1
+ ν¯sκ2 = ξ¯
s
t ,
ξst − ξ
b
t = ν
s
κ1
−
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{0<Tk≤κ1}
+ νsκ2 −
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{κ1<Tk≤κ2} −
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{κ2<Tk≤t} ≤ ν¯κ1 + ν¯κ2 = ξ¯
s
t .
Recursively, we can see that if κi−1 ≤ t < κi, with i ∈ {3, 4, . . . }, then, Y t = y−
i−1∑
ι=1
ν¯sκι ≥ 0 and
ξst =
i−1∑
ι=1
νsκι ≥
i−1∑
ι=1
ν¯sκι = ξ¯
s
t ,
ξst − ξ
b
t =
i−1∑
ι=1
(
νsκι −
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{κι−1<Tk≤κι}
)
−
∞∑
k=1
νbTk1{κi−1<Tk≤t} ≤
i−1∑
ι=1
ν¯sκι = ξ¯
s
t .
Therefore, by the previously seen, we conclude ξ¯s ∈ As(y) and ξst−ξ
b
t ≤ ξ¯
s
t ≤ ξ
s
t for all t ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. (Construction of (3.10)). The proof of this result shall be given in two
parts. In the first part, by smooth fit arguments, it is constructed the function v which is a solution
to the HJB equation (3.4). In the second part, we prove that v is in C2,1(R+ × R+). Let x < Fγ
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and consider Eq. (3.7). In this case, the only solution that remains bounded as x ↓ 0 is given by
(A.2) v(x, y) = A1(y)x
n,
where n is the positive solution to (3.14). In order to find the form of the function A1(y) that ap-
pears above, we study the behaviour of the solution v(x, y) = A1(y)x
n along the boundary x = Fγ .
Now we look for a solution that is continuous differentiable at the boundary x = Fγ . Evaluating
(A.2) on the left hand side of the equality in (3.8), and recalling thatY(x) =
1
λ
ln(x/Fγ), we obtain
Lγv(x, y) + γ
[
v(Fγ , y − Y(x)) +
1
λ
(1− e−λY(x))x− CsY(x)
]
= −γA1(y)x
n + γA1(y − Y(x))F
n
γ +
γ(x− Fγ)
λ
− γCsY(x) =:K(x, y).
By differentiating with respect to x, we get that
Kx(x, y) = −γnA1(y)x
n−1 − γA′1(y − Y(x))
F nγ
λx
+
γ
λ
− γ
Cs
λx
.(A.3)
In order for the solution to be continuously differentiable at the boundary, we take x = Fγ in (A.3),
and note that
−γnA1(y)F
n−1
γ − γA
′
1(y)
F nγ
λFγ
+
γ
λ
− γ
Cs
λFγ
= 0,
where the equality follows since (3.8) holds in x = Fγ . The above equation is equivalent to the
following ODE for A1,
A′1(y)F
n
γ = −λnA1(y)F
n
γ + Fγ − Cs.
The solution of this equation is given by
A1(y) =
(Fγ − Cs)
λnF nγ
(1− e−λny),
which implies that, when x < Fγ , the solution to the HJB equation (3.4) is given by
(A.4) v(x, y) =
(Fγ − Cs)
λnF nγ
(1− e−λny)xn.
Now we look for the solution of the HJB equation within the region F ≤ x < Fγ e
λy. Since
v(Fγ−, y − Y(x)) =
(Fγ − Cs)
λn
(
1−
xn
F nγ
e−λny
)
,
Eq. (3.8) is given by
Lγv(x, y) + γ
[
Fγ − Cs
λn
(
1−
xn
F nγ
e−λny
)
+
x− Fγ
λ
− CsY(x)
]
= 0.(A.5)
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In order to find the solution to this equation, we look first at the following set of equations,
Lγv1(x, y) + γ
(Fγ − Cs)
λn
(
1−
xn
F nγ
e−λny
)
= 0,
Lγv2(x, y) + γ
[
(x− Fγ)
λ
− CsY(x)
]
= 0.
The solutions to the previous equations are given, respectively, by
v1(x, y) = −
(Fγ − Cs)
λnF nγ
e−λny xn +
γ(Fγ − Cs)
λn(δ + γ)
,
v2(x, y) =
γ
λ(η + γ)
x−
γCs
λ(δ + γ)
ln x+ C,
with η = δ − µ and C:=
γ
λ(δ + γ)
(
bCs
δ + γ
+ Cs lnFγ − F
)
. Hence, the solution to (A.5) that
remains bounded for large values of γ is given by
v(x, y) = A2(y)x
mγ −
(Fγ − Cs)
λnF nγ
e−λny xn +
γ
λ(η + γ)
x−
γCs
λ(δ + γ)
ln x+
γ(Fγ − Cs)
λn(δ + γ)
+ C,
for some function A2 : R+ −→ R. Recall that mγ is the negative solution to (3.15). Since u
satisfies u(Fγ−, y) = u(Fγ+, y), we conclude that for each Fγ ≤ x < Fγ e
λy, the solution u to the
equation (3.4), has the following expression
v(x, y) = Aγ
(
x
Fγ
)mγ
−
(Fγ − Cs)
λnF nγ
e−λny xn(A.6)
+
γ
λ(η + γ)
x−
γCs
λ(δ + γ)
ln x+
γ(Fγ − Cs)
λn(δ + γ)
+ C,
where Aγ is as in (3.12). Finally, in order to obtain the value of the optimal barrier Fγ , look for a
solution v such that vx is continuous at x = Fγ . Since vx(Fγ−, y) = vx(Fγ+, y), we get
Fγ − Cs =
Fγmγ
δ + γ
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
)
−
Csmγ
δ + γ
(
δ
n
+
γb
δ + γ
)
+
γFγ
η + γ
−
γCs
δ + γ
.
This implies that Fγ is given as in (3.11).
Now, let us find a general solution to (3.4) for the region x ≥ Fγ e
λy. We have that a particular
solution to (3.9) is given by
γ
λ(η + γ)
x(1− e−λy)−
γ
δ + γ
Csy.
Then, the solution to the equation (3.9) that remains bounded for large values of γ is given by
(A.7) v(x, y) = A3(y)x
mγ +
γ
λ(η + γ)
x(1 − e−λy)−
γ
δ + γ
Csy,
for some function A3(y) : R+ −→ R. Finally, to find the expressions for the function A3(y)
involved in (A.7), we ask that v is continuous at x = Fγ e
λy. Then, since v(Fγ e
λy−, y) =
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v(Fγ e
λy +, y), it is not difficult to check that
A3(y) =
Aγ(1− e
−λmγy)
F
mγ
γ
.
Therefore, for each x ≥ Fγ e
λy, the solution u has the following expression
(A.8) v(x, y) =
Aγ(1− e
−λmγy)xmγ
F
mγ
γ
+
γ(1− e−λy)x
λ(η + γ)
−
γCsy
δ + γ
.
From (A.4), (A.6), (A.8) and since v(x, 0) = 0, we conclude that the solution v to the HJB equation
(3.4) is given by (3.10). 
Now, we shall proceed to verify that v, given in (3.10), belongs to C2,1(R+ ×R+).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. (Smooth of (3.10)). Note that by construction, it is sufficient to show that
v is C2,1 at x = Fγ and x = Fγ e
λy, respectively, since v ∈ C2,1((R+ ×R+) \ A), where
A:= {(x, y) ∈ R+ ×R+ : x = Fγ or y = Fγ e
λy}.
Smooth fit at the variable y. Using (3.10), it is easy to see that vy(Fγ−, y) = vy(Fγ+, y). Implying
that vy is continuous at x = Fγ . Calculating first derivative in (3.10), it can be verified that
(A.9)


vy(Fγ e
λy−, y) = Fγ − Cs,
vy(Fγ e
λy +, y) = λmγAγ +
γFγ
η + γ
−
γCs
δ + γ
.
From (3.11)–(3.12), it can be verified that
λmγAγ +
γFγ
η + γ
−
γCs
δ + γ
− (Fγ − Cs) = 0.(A.10)
Then, by (A.9)–(A.10), it yields that vy(Fγ e
λy−, y) = Fγ − Cs = vy(Fγ e
λy +, y). Therefore vy
is continuous at x = Fγ e
λy.
Smooth fit at the variable x. We will show that vxx is continuous onR
+×R+. We will first verify
that vx is continuous at x = Fγ e
λy. From (3.10), it follows that
vx(x, y) =


Aγmγx
mγ−1
F
mγ
γ
−
(Fγ − Cs) e
−λny xn−1
λF nγ
+
γ
λ(η + γ)
−
γCs
λ(γ + δ)x
, if Fγ ≤ x < Fγ e
λy,
Aγmγ(1− e
−λmγy)xmγ−1
F
mγ
γ
+
γ(1− e−λy)
λ(η + γ)
, if x ≥ Fγ e
λy .
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Then, using (A.10), we get that
vx(Fγ e
λy +, y) =
Aγmγ(1− e
−λmγy) eλy(mγ−1)
Fγ
+
γ(1− e−λy)
λ(η + γ)
=
Aγmγ e
λy(mγ−1)
Fγ
−
e−λy
λFγ
(
λAγmγ +
γFγ
η + γ
)
+
γ
λ(η + γ)
=
Aγmγ e
λy(mγ−1)
Fγ
−
(Fγ − Cs) e
−λy
λFγ
+
γ
λ(η + γ)
−
γCs e
−λy
λFγ(γ + δ)
= vx(Fγ e
λy−, y).
We now show that vxx is continuous onR
+×R+ using the fact that vx is continuous onR
+×R+.
Since vx is continuous at x = Fγ , from (3.7) and (3.8), we have
vxx(Fγ−, y) =
δv(Fγ , y)− µvx(Fγ, y)
1
2
σ2F 2γ
= vxx(Fγ+, y).(A.11)
If x = Fγ e
λy, using (3.8) and (3.9), it follows that
vxx(Fγ e
λy−, y) =
1
σ2F 2γ
[
2
(
(δ + γ)v(Fγ, y)(A.12)
− µFγvx(Fγ, y) + γ
(
Csy −
Fγ
λ
(1− e−λy)
))]
= vxx(Fγ e
λy +, y).
Hence (A.11) and (A.12), we conclude that vxx is continuous onR
+ ×R+. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. First, recall that mγ was defined as the negative solution of (3.15), and ob-
serve that mγ −→
γ→0
m0, where m0 is the negative solution to (3.14). Letting γ → 0 in (3.16), it is
easy to see that aγ −→
γ→0
1. On the other hand, letting γ →∞ in (3.16), it can be verified that
lim
γ→∞
aγ = lim
γ→∞
δ
mγ
−
(
δ
n
+
γb
δ + γ
)
η(δ + γ)
(η + γ)mγ
−
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
) = δ + nb
δ − µn
.(A.13)
Since n is the positive solution to (3.14), it yields that
(A.14) δ + nb =
1
2
σ2n2, and δ − µn =
1
2
σ2n(n− 1).
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Therefore, from (A.13), (A.14), we conclude that aγ →
n
n− 1
, if γ → ∞. Now we shall prove
that 1 < aγ <
n
n− 1
, for all γ > 0. In order to prove this result we first note that by (A.14),
(A.15)


δ
n
+
γb
δ + γ
=
γσ2n2 + 2δ2
2n(δ + γ)
> 0,
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
=
γσ2n(n− 1) + 2δη
2n(η + γ)
> 0.
On the other hand, we have for each γ > 0,
δ
δ + γ
−
η
η + γ
−
γmγ
δ + γ
(
b
δ + γ
+
µ
η + γ
)
(A.16)
=
γµ
(δ + γ)(η + γ)
−
γmγ
(δ + γ)
(
(η + γ)σ2 + 2µ2
2(δ + γ)(η + γ)
)
> 0,
sincemγ < 0, with γ > 0. (A.15), (A.16) imply
0 <
η
η + γ
−
mγ
δ + γ
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
)
<
δ
δ + γ
−
mγ
δ + γ
(
δ
n
+
γb
δ + γ
)
.(A.17)
Therefore using (3.16), (A.17), it follows that 1 < aγ . In order to prove the remaining inequality
we just note that using (3.16) it is enough to show that
nη
(n− 1)(η + γ)
−
δ
δ + γ
−
mγ
δ + γ
(
δ
n− 1
−
δ
n
−
γb
δ + γ
−
γµn
(n− 1)(η + γ)
)
> 0.(A.18)
Note that
nη
(n− 1)(η + γ)
−
δ
δ + γ
=
γ(δ − nµ) + δµ
(n− 1)(δ + γ)(η + γ)
> 0,(A.19)
since δ − nµ > 0. Similarly using (A.14) and the fact that η = δ − µ we obtain that
δ
n− 1
−
δ
n
−
γb
δ + γ
−
γµn
(n− 1)(η + γ)
(A.20)
=
δ
n(n− 1)
−
γb(n− 1)(η + γ) + γµn(δ + γ)
(n− 1)(δ + γ)(η + γ)
=
δ(δ + γ)(η + γ)− n2γµ(δ + γ)− γbn(n− 1)(η + γ)
n(n− 1)(δ + γ)(η + γ)
=
δ(δ + γ)(η + γ)− δnγµ+ 1
2
σ2n2γµ(n− 1)− δγ(η + γ)
n(n− 1)(δ + γ)(η + γ)
=
δ2η + σ
2
2
n(n− 1)(δ + γµ)
n(n− 1)(δ + γ)(η + γ)
> 0.
Therefore using (A.19), (A.20), and the fact that mγ < 0 we obtain that (A.18) holds and hence
aγ <
n
n− 1
. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.5. In order to show that (3.17) holds, it is enough to prove that

Gl(x, y, l; v) < 0, for x < Fγ ,
Gl(x, y,Y(x); v) = 0 and Gll(x, y,Y(x); v) < 0, for Fγ ≤ x < Fγ e
λy,
Gl(x, y, l; v) > 0, for x ≥ Fγ e
λy,
where Y(x) =
1
λ
ln(x/Fγ).
Maximum on the first zone. Let x < Fγ . Taking first derivatives in (3.10) and evaluating at the
point (x e−λl, y − l), we get that
vx(x e
−λl, y − l) =
Fγ − Cs
λF nγ
(e−λnl− e−λny)xn−1 eλl,
vy(x e
−λl, y − l) =
Fγ − Cs
F nγ
e−λny xn.
Then,
Gl(x, y, l; v) = −λvx(x e
−λl, y − l)x e−λl−vy(x e
−λl, y − l) + e−λl x− Cs
= −
Fγ − Cs
F nγ
xn e−λnl +e−λl x− Cs.
Note that the above expression is negative if and only if
(A.21)
e−λl x− Cs
(x e−λl)n
<
Fγ − Cs
F nγ
.
Taking the first derivative with respect to x on the left hand side of (A.21), we have
∂
∂x
(
e−λl x− Cs
(x e−λl)n
)
=
n− 1
xn+1
(
nCs
n− 1
eλl−x
)
eλl(n−1) .
By (3.11) and Lemma 3.4, we know that x < Fγ e
λl <
nCs
n− 1
eλl. Then,
∂
∂x
(
e−λl x− Cs
(x e−λl)n
)
> 0,
which implies that
e−λl x− Cs
(x e−λl)n
is non-decreasing with respect to x. It yields that
e−λl x− Cs
(x e−λl)n
<
e−λl Fγ − Cs
(Fγ e−λl)n
, for each x < Fγ .
Showing that
e−λl Fγ − Cs
(Fγ e−λl)n
<
Fγ − Cs
F nγ
we obtain (A.21), which is equivalent to see that
(A.22) (e−λl− e−λnl)aγ < 1− e
−λnl,
since Fγ = Csaγ . Taking l
∗:=
lnn
λ(n− 1)
, it can be verified that
(e−λl
∗
− e−λnl
∗
)aγ = max
l
{(e−λl− e−λnl)aγ}.
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Since aγ <
n
n− 1
and (n + 1)n < nn(n+ 1), with n > 1, we get that
(e−λl
∗
− e−λnl
∗
)aγ = (n
− 1
n−1 − n−
n
n−1 )aγ < 1− n
− n
n−1 = 1− e−λnl
∗
.(A.23)
This means that (A.22) is satisfied for any l > l∗. Now, if l ≤ l∗, we shall prove the statement
(A.22) by contradiction. Suppose that there exists 0 6= l1 ≤ l
∗ such that
(e−λl1 − e−λnl1)aγ = 1− e
−λnl1 ,(A.24)
(e−λl− e−λnl)aγ ≥ 1− e
−λnl, for each l ≤ l1 ≤ l
∗.
Since
(e−λl− e−λnl)aγ ≤ (e
−λl1 − e−λnl1)aγ ≤ (e
−λl∗ − e−λnl
∗
)aγ ,
we have that (e−λl
∗
− e−λnl
∗
)aγ ≥ 1 − e
−λnl∗ , which is a contradiction with (A.23). If l∗ < l1 and
satisfies that (A.24), we have that
1− e−λl
∗n < 1− e−λl1n = (e−λl1 − e−λnl1)aγ < (e
−λl∗ − e−λnl
∗
)aγ ,
which contradicts (A.23). Therefore, (A.22) is true for any l and it yields (A.21). We conclude that
the maximum on the right hand side of (3.17) is achieved at l = 0 when x < Fγ .
Maximum on the second zone. Let Fγ ≤ x < Fγ e
λy. Taking first derivatives of v and evaluating
(Fγ , y − Y(x)) in them, it follows that
−λFγvx(Fγ, y − Y(x)) = −
δmγ(Fγ − Cs)
n(δ + γ)
+ (Fγ − Cs) e
−λn(y−Y(x))
−
γFγ
η + γ
(
1−
µmγ
δ + γ
)
+
γCs
δ + γ
(
1 +
bmγ
δ + γ
)
,
−vy(Fγ, y − Y(x)) = −(Fγ − Cs) e
−λn(y−Y(x)) .
Then, recalling that Fγ = Csaγ , where aγ is given in (3.16), we get that
Gl(x, y,Y(x); v) = aγCs
(
η
η + γ
−
mγ
δ + γ
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
))
−
Cs
δ + γ
(
δ −mγ
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
))
= 0.
Therefore, l = Y(x) is a critical point of G(x, y, l; v); recall that the definition of G is given in
(3.6). To verify that l = Y(x) is a maximum of G(x, y, l; v), we need to see that
Gll(x, y,Y(x); v) < 0.
Firstly, note that
(A.25) λ2Fγvx(Fγ, y − Y(x)) = λ
2Aγmγ − λ(Fγ − Cs) e
−λn(y−Y(x)) +
λγFγ
η + γ
−
λγCs
δ + γ
.
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Now, taking the second derivatives of v and evaluating (Fγ , y − Y(x)) in them, it follows that
(A.26)


λ2F 2γ vxx(Fγ , y − Y(x)) = λ
2Aγmγ(mγ − 1)
−λ(Fγ − Cs)(n− 1) e
−λn(y−Y(x))+
λγCs
δ + γ
,
2λFγvxy(Fγ, y − Y(x)) = 2λn(Fγ − Cs) e
−λn(y−Y(x)),
vyy(Fγ, y − Y(x)) = −λn(Fγ − Cs) e
−λn(y−Y(x)) .
By (A.25)–(A.26), we get that
Gll(x, y,Y(x); v) = λ
2F 2γ vxx(Fγ, y − Y(x)) + 2λFγvxy(Fγ, y − Y(x))(A.27)
+ λ2Fγvx(Fγ , y − Y(x)) + vyy(Fγ, y − Y(x))− λFγ
=
Csλm
2
γ
δ + γ
(
δaγ
n
−
aγγµ
η + γ
−
δ
n
−
bγ
δ + γ
−
aγη(δ + γ)
m2γ(η + γ)
)
.
To see that the above expression is negative, we need only to prove that
aγ
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
−
η(δ + γ)
m2γ(η + γ)
)
−
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
< 0,(A.28)
which is equivalent to see
(A.29) aγ
(
δ
n
−
µγ
η + γ
)
−
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
< 0,
since −aγ
η(δ + γ)
(η + γ)m2γ
< 0. Verifying that
(A.30) δ
(
δ
n
−
µγ
η + γ
)
<
η(δ + γ)
η + γ
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
,
and recalling that aγ is given by (3.16), it yields (A.29). We shall show (A.30). Observe that
(A.31) δ
(
δ
n
−
µγ
η + γ
)
,
is non-increasing with respect to γ > 0 and
(A.32)


δ
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
)
↑
δ2
n
, when γ → 0,
δ
(
δ
n
−
γµ
η + γ
)
↓ δ
(
δ
n
− µ
)
, when γ →∞.
If b > 0, i.e.
σ2
2
> µ, then
(A.33)
η(δ + γ)
η + γ
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
,
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is non-decreasing with respect to γ > 0 and
(A.34)


η(δ + γ)
η + γ
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
↓
δ2
n
, when γ → 0,
η(δ + γ)
η + γ
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
↑ η
(
δ
n
+ b
)
, when γ →∞,
From here and by (A.32), it follows (A.30) and therefore we have that (A.27) is negative. If b ≤ 0,
i.e.
σ2
2
≤ µ, it can be verified that (A.33) is non-increasing with respect to γ > 0 and
(A.35)


η(δ + γ)
η + γ
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
↑
δ2
n
, when γ → 0,
η(δ + γ)
η + γ
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
↓ η
(
δ
n
+ b
)
, when γ →∞.
Defining the function h(γ) as
(A.36) h(γ):= δ
(
δ
n
−
µγ
η + γ
)
−
η(δ + γ)
η + γ
(
δ
n
+
bγ
δ + γ
)
,
we can see that
(A.37)


h(γ)→ 0, when γ → 0,
h(γ)→ δ
(
δ
n
− µ
)
− η
(
δ
n
+ b
)
, when γ →∞,
since (A.32), (A.35) hold. In order to show (A.30), it is enough to prove that h(γ) is non-increasing
and
(A.38) δ
(
δ
n
− µ
)
− η
(
δ
n
+ b
)
< 0.
Since n is the positive solution to (3.14) and is bigger than one, it follows that
(A.39)
δ
µ
= n +
σ2
2µ
n(n− 1) > n,
this yields that nµ < δ. Then, applying this in (A.39), we have
(A.40)
δµ
n
= µ2 +
σ2µ
2
(n− 1) <
1
2
σ2δ − µ
(
1
2
σ2 − µ
)
,
which implies (A.38). Now, taking first derivative in (A.36), we see that
(A.41) h′(γ) =
η
(η + γ)2
(
−δµ +
δµ
n
− bη
)
.
Using (A.40), it can be shown −δµ +
δµ
n
− bη < 0. This implies that h(γ) is a negative non-
increasing function. Therefore, it is true (A.29) and we have that (A.27) is negative. Thus the
maximum at the right hand side of (3.17) is achieved at l = Y(x), when Fγ ≤ x < Fγ e
λy.
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Maximum on the third zone. Let x ≥ Fγ e
λy. Taking the first derivatives of v and evaluating
(x e−λl, y − l) in them, it follows that
−λvx(x e
−λl, y − l)x e−λl = −
λmγAγx
mγ (e−λmγ l− e−λmγy)
F
mγ
γ
−
γx(e−λl− e−λy)
η + γ
,
−vy(x e
−λl, y − l) = −
λmγAγ(x e
−λy)mγ
F
mγ
γ
−
γx e−λy
η + γ
+
γCs
δ + γ
.
Then,
Gl(x, y, l; v) = −λvx(x e
−λl, y − l)x e−λl−vy(x e
−λl, y − l) + e−λl x− Cs
= −
λmγAγ(x e
−λl)mγ
F
mγ
γ
+
ηx e−λl
η + γ
−
δCs
δ + γ
.
To see that the above expression is positive, is equivalent to show that
ηx e−λl
η + γ
−
mγλAγ(x e
−λl)mγ
F
mγ
γ
>
δCs
δ + γ
.(A.42)
Observe that from (3.12) and (A.29), it can be verified that Aγ < 0. Then, it follows that
ηx e−λl
η + γ
≥
ηFγ e
λ(y−l)
η + γ
,
−
mγλAγ(x e
−λl)mγ
F
mγ
γ
≥ −mγλAγ e
λmγ (y−l),
since x ≥ Fγ e
λy andmγ < 0. Then
ηx e−λl
η + γ
−
mγλAγ(x e
−λl)mγ
F
mγ
γ
>
ηFγ e
λ(y−l)
η + γ
−mγλAγ e
λmγ (y−l) =:g(l).(A.43)
Note that g(l) is non-increasing with respect to l and from (3.11)–(3.12), we get that g(y) =
δCs
δ + γ
.
Therefore, (A.43) yields that (A.42). Thus, the maximum at the right hand side of (3.17) is achieved
at l = y, when x ≥ Fγ e
λy. 
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